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Then Djilas writes that Dimitrov s ears were red, and big red important international question. If the partisan movement is
blotches cropped up on his face covering his spots of eczema. wrapped up, then they will have no reason to attack you. It s not
His sparse hair straggled and hung in lifeless strands over his so easy to start a war now. If you are convinced that the partisans
wrinkled neck. I felt sorry for him...The Lion of the Leipzig have a chance of victory, then that s a different matter. But I
Trials...looked dejected and dispirited. (pp. 176-177) V.Z.] somewhat doubt it.
13 The entire conversation recorded by Djilas about the draft of The Bulgarian records note the following remark by Kostov:
a Bulgarian-Romanian treaty sent to the Soviet government, We believe that a defeat of the partisan movement in Greece
which in turn expressed no objections over the article on the would create a very difficult situation for other Balkan coun-
customs union, is absent from the Soviet and Bulgarian records. tries. To this Stalin replied:
Kolarov s account contains only the following phrase: Kolarov Of course the partisans must be supported. But if the prospects
points out that the treaty with Romania had been harmonized for the partisan movement are falling, it is better to postpone the
with Moscow. fight until better times. That which is lacking in relative forces
14 [Translator s note: nobody here means the United States cannot be supplemented with moans and exclamations. What is
and Great Britain, not the Communist Party of China. This needed is a thoughtful reckoning of forces. If this shows that at
phrase reveals Stalin s emphasis on realpolitik as a method to the present time the matter is moving nowhere, one must not be
prevent imperialists consolidation and intervention into afraid to admit it. There have been other instances when partisan
Balkan affairs. V.Z.] movements were terminated given an unfavorable situation. If
15 The Bulgarian records contain the following words expressed it s impossible today, it will be possible tomorrow. You are afraid
by Stalin over this matter: You see the kind of war that is raging to state the question clearly. You are under the impression of a
in China. We don t have a single one of our soldiers there. moral obligation. If you cannot lift the weight which you have
16 According to Bulgarian records, the question of signing a hoisted upon yourselves, you must admit it. You must not be
protocol on mutual consultation arose in connection with afraid of some kind of a categorical imperative of moral
Dimitrov s statement on 10 February concerning Moscow: We obligation. We do not have such categorical imperatives. The
also receive little information from here. Stalin responded: entire question rests in the balance of forces. We go into battle
You have the right to demand from us to keep you informed. not when the enemy wants us to, but when it s in our interests.
Let us then put together a protocol on obligatory consultation Further discussion of the Greek question, following these
between us on all important international questions. This is observations by Stalin, is recorded in the Bulgarian records:
similarly recorded in the Soviet record. Kardelj: Over the next several months the chances of the
17 [Translator s note: According to Djilas, he was red and, what partisans will become clear.
was a sign of agitation with him, he drew his head down between Stalin: In that case, fine, you can wait. Perhaps you are right. I
his shoulders and made pauses in his sentences where they did also doubted the abilities of the Chinese and advised them to
not belong. (p. 179) V.Z.] come to a temporary agreement with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-
18 [Translator s note: The exchange on the failure to inform the Shek]. They formally agreed with us, but in practice continued
USSR on sending Yugoslav troops to Albania was more serious on their own course that is, mobilizing the forces of the
and emotional, according to Djilas book: Stalin shouted, This Chinese people. After this, they openly raised the question: we
could lead to serious international complications... Kardelj will continue to fight; the people support us. We said: fine, what
explained that all that had not yet been final and added that he do you need? It turned out that the conditions were very
did not remember a single foreign problem but that the Yugoslav favorable to them. They turned out to be right, we turned out to
Government did not consult with the Soviets& It s not so! be wrong. Maybe we will turn out to be wrong here as well. But
Stalin cried. You don t consult at all. That is not your mistake, we want you to act with certainty. Kolarov: Will America allow
but your policy yes, your policy! Cut off, Kardelj fell silent a partisan victory?
and did not press his view. (pp.179-180) V.Z.] Stalin: They won t be asked. If there are enough forces for
19 [Translator s Note: In Djilas s book Stalin says: No, they victory, and if there are persons capable of employing the force
have no prospect of success at all. What do you think, that Great of the people, then the fight must be continued. But one must not
Britain and the United States the United States, the most think that if things are not successful in Greece, then everything
powerful state in the world will permit you to break their line is lost.
of communication in the Mediterranean Sea! Nonsense. And we The Soviet record overall corroborates this course of
have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as discussion, but sets it down in significantly condensed form,
quickly as possible. (p. 182) V.Z.] without a number of details. In particular, it does not record
20 As noted in the Bulgarian records, in particular in Kolarov s Kostov s remark found in Bulgarian records on the difficult
account, Stalin cautioned the Yugoslav side against careless consequences the defeat of the Greek partisans would bring to
involvement in Albania, where the USA and England might strike other Balkan countries (in the Djilas report this remark is
back, claiming to be defenders of Albanian independence. With attributed to Dimitrov), and Kardelj s negative reply to Stalin s
this in mind, Stalin put this question to Kardelj: If the Greek question whether Yugoslavia would go to war in the event of a
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