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little public concern that ordinary Americans might be involved in such
treachery. Instead, in the public s mind, the threat mostly remained external.
Of course, in the aftermath of the attacks, Americans did become much
more cautious and suspicious. And some people were leery of anyone who
appeared foreign or who seemed to be Islamic. To be sure, Americans
remained apprehensive, resigning themselves to a new era of color-coded
terrorism alerts and increasingly pervasive security measures in everyday life.
All of these anxieties did relatively little to evoke a widespread conspiracy
theory interpretation of the frightening new situation, however. Indeed, by
the early 2000s, America s ideas about conspiracy and conspiracy theory had
undergone a dramatic transformation from the early Cold War, and whatever
intense emotions the terrorist attacks elicited, fear and paranoia about the
threat as a conspiracy per se were not foremost among them.
And so the United States began its military campaign against terrorism.
Afghanistan was identified as the first target since Al-Qaeda seemed to be
based there, and it seemed to be receiving support from the ruling Taliban,
which was already known for its anti-Western views. That military action
included a hunt for Osama bin Laden. But although the Taliban was quickly
driven from power, bin Laden proved to be a wily and resourceful enemy.
Despite numerous attempts to locate him, he managed to avoid death or
capture, apparently escaping to the rugged region along the Afghan-Pakistani
border.
WAR IN IRAQ
Soon after its initial success, the United States successfully assembled
a group of willing nations to assume most of the security support for
Afghanistan, as a new regime tried to rebuild the Afghan nation. Now largely
freed from tending to the situation of Afghanistan, the president and his ad-
visors considered the theaters of war they thought should follow Afghanistan
in the global war on terrorism. The administration set its sites on Iraq. With
Belief and Disbelief 163
increasing confidence, White House officials declared that Iraq, a nation with
which the United States had tangled in the Persian Gulf War a decade earlier,
had harbored and aided terrorists and that it was somehow implicated in the
September 11 attack.
The administration aggressively promoted the idea that Iraq was linked to
the 9/11 attacks and that it was a dangerous terrorist state with weapons of
mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons). They argued
that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein would surely make such weapons available
to terrorist groups and perhaps even use them himself. In the wake of the
horror of September 11, it was too dangerous to let this situation stand,
according to administration officials. Regime change in Iraq was clearly
their goal.
Many White House officials saw the case against Iraq to be compelling
in its own right and felt there was little need to obtain the approval from
the United Nations before taking swift action. The most visible holdout to
this view within the administration was Secretary of State Colin Powell. He
strongly advocated that the matter be taken to the UN for their approval,
and eventually this course of action was taken. Thereafter, in late 2002, the
UN approved such a resolution. It demanded that Iraq give up any weapons
of mass destruction it had stockpiled and that it promptly terminate any
programs aimed at producing such weapons.
The Iraqis did not comply with weapons inspections to the satisfaction
of the United States, and a few months later, in February 2003, Secretary
of State Colin Powell was dispatched to the UN to call for swift follow-up
action. In his speech to the world body, Powell spoke authoritatively about
evidence he said the United States had assembled. This compelling evidence,
he declared, demonstrated that Saddam Hussein s regime already harbored a
vast stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, and it defiantly maintained an
aggressive program to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. (These assertions
were in line with previous declarations from the Bush White House and its
close ally, the administration of British Prime Minister Tony Blair.) Therefore,
the United States requested the UN to support a resolution that specifically
authorized the use of force to compel Iraqi compliance with the previous
resolution. There was substantial opposition from other UN member states,
however, and the proposal was withdrawn.
In March 2003, the White House announced that diplomatic efforts to
secure Iraqi compliance had failed. Shortly thereafter, the United States and
allies commenced the war in Iraq, which it called Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The conflict initially went well for the United States and its allies. Baghdad
soon fell. Saddam Hussein fled from the capital and went into hiding. (He
was not captured until December.)
In May 2003, with the regime toppled, George W. Bush made a dramatic
announcement on the flight deck of a U.S. naval aircraft carrier that was at sea
off the coast of San Diego. He declared to Americans and the world, Major
164 Conspiracy Theory in Film, Television, and Politics
combat operations in Iraq have ended. That assessment, however, would
not turn out to be accurate.
Before the war, administration officials apparently believed that when the
fighting concluded, the victorious Americans would be welcomed with open
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